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The occurrence of Asian Financial Crisis and successive scandals highlight the importance of cor-
porate governance on which the public start to stress. “Pursuing internationalization for sustainable 
development” has become a trend for corporate development in the future. Nonetheless, the promo-
tion of internationalization enhances multiple operating environments and information complexity. 
An enterprise therefore has to adjust the existing organizational structure and construct favorable 
corporate governance mechanisms to timely refl ect market demands and have the enterprise acquire 
the advantage of the economy of scale through overseas extension points. With the approach of 
globalization era, the extreme dependence of economic activities on import/export hastens Taiwan 
actively joining in World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance the circulation of goods and re-
sources among member states. Under such a trend, the industrial structure in Taiwan needs to be 
adjusted, and industries with competitiveness would present larger development space. Aiming at 
listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange, the research period is set 16 years, from 1999 to 2014. 
The research results conclude that 1. competition would affect corporate governance, 2. competi-
tion would infl uence corporate performance, and 3. corporate governance would affect corporate 
performance. The research results are expected to inspire international enterprises with the compe-
tition evaluation and corporate governance adjustment to promote the corporate performance.
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1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The occurrence of Asian Financial Crisis highlights the importance of corporate 
governance to be emphasized by the public. The US regulations for corporate 
governance of enterprises are comparatively complete and strict; however, a lot 
of scandals being burst out, such as Enron event, Worldcom, Xerox, and Merck 
& Co., Inc., result in increasing discussion on the issue of corporate governance. 
Moreover, a lot of scandals about domestic enterprises’ involuntary bankruptcy 
and asset tunneling also happen in past years, e.g. Procomp, News Singles, and 
Wong EC, to seriously damage domestic economic systems. As a result, man-
agement authorities and investors in various countries present high concerns on 
corporate governance mechanisms of enterprises in order to ensure the equity not 
being damaged by enterprises’ ill oversight mechanisms or others’ manipulation.
Following the trend of internationalization and liberalization in global mar-
kets, the increasing economy and trade relationship and dependence among states 
form a structured global economic system. It therefore greatly impacts existing 
industrial operating strategies in various countries and hastens most enterprises 
encountering the choices of industrial upgrading or transformation. Under such 
a trend, the industrial structure in Taiwan will have to be adjusted, and industries 
with competitiveness would present larger development space. With the approach 
of the globalization era, economic activities in Taiwan and enterprises’ interna-
tional strategy placement are often affected by global economic environments. 
As economic activities in Taiwan extremely depend on import/export, Taiwan 
actively joins in World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance the circulation of 
goods and resources among member states. Fiercely competitive environments 
would affect corporate performance as the higher competition would reduce man-
agers’ behavior of neglect and the waste of corporate resources to further en-
hance the productivity. When an enterprise enters a brand-new investment market 
for the global displacement, it would face the unique challenges of customers’ 
consumption patterns and needs, economic systems, and customs and culture in 
host countries being different from the home country. International enterprises, 
on the other hand, would invest in large amount of R&D costs and actively in-
novate to consolidate existing markets and respond to local market demands, 
and the internal organizational structure would approach to precise division of 
labor and professionalization. What is more, the expanding market size would 
promote the internal and external management complexity and the encountered 
environmental heterogeneity of the enterprise. In this case, overcoming the liabil-
ity of foreignness, reducing operational risks, and promoting performance in the 
internationalization process would become the key success factors in the interna-
tionalization of an enterprise. Accordingly, this study is motivated to discuss the 
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relationship among international enterprises’ corporate governance, competition, 
and operating performance. It is expected that the research results would inspire 
international enterprises in the competition evaluation and corporate governance 
adjustment to promote the corporate performance.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
2.1. Corporate governance
Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) explained corporate governance mechanism as 
to ensure investors, the capital providers, acquiring the deserved rewards. Brea-
ley et al. (2011) defined corporate governance as a mechanism to supervise an 
enterprise practicing internal and external auditing in order to ensure the enter-
prise conforming to social norms, proceeding relevant operating activities, and 
considering stakeholders’ benefits. Cheng et al. (2011) pointed out corporate 
governance mechanism as the norms or principles established by an enterprise, 
definitely defining the work responsibilities and the responsibilities for external 
investors, to supervise the behaviors of corporate owners, directors, and manag-
ers (e.g. stockholders). According to corporate governance mechanism, Collins 
and Morten (2011) extended the meaning as enhancing strategic management 
effectiveness and supervising managers’ behaviors through system design and 
execution so as to ensure the deserved rewards of external investors (minority 
stockholders and creditors) and give considerations to other stakeholders’ bene-
fits. More specifically, corporate governance mechanism was to prevent deputies 
damaging corporate value and reinforce corporate competitiveness and manage-
ment effectiveness in order to guarantee the equity of capital providers and other 
stakeholders (Črnigoj and Mramor 2015). Dhaliwal et al. (2011) regarded it as the 
contract between stockholders internally defined by a company and management 
echelon in charge of the management; the core of internal corporate governance 
mechanism was the board of directors, who were responsible for the sustain-
able management of the company and supervising administrative authorities who 
were responsible for the management. When financial crises occurred in the com-
pany, the board of directors was also responsible for the creditors. Apparently, the 
board of directors was responsible for both stockholders and the company. Ela-
min and Tlaiss (2015) regarded the close relationship between corporate govern-
ance and ownership diversification. When stock rights were extremely dispersed, 
the management echelon was mostly undertaken by professional managers; and, 
corporate governance focused on designing a system to prevent such professional 
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managers considering their own benefits, even pocketing with their authorities 
and neglecting other stockholders’ equity.
Hall and Wagner (2012) considered that a company was composed of stock-
holders, employees, creditors, managers, consumers, suppliers, governmental or-
ganizations, and financial institutions and a contract relying on the common goods 
was provided for such stakeholders in order to correct and restrain the behaviors. 
In short, agency theory aimed to discuss the occurrence of distinct agent relation-
ship and the management mechanism. Nevertheless, Kao et al. (2012) indicated 
that, after an enterprise separating ownership and management rights, manag-
ers took charge of most operation and management affairs of the company, but 
the wealth was not obviously related to corporate performance because of fewer 
stocks held. In this case, managers might hide important information and engage 
in illegal and self-interested behaviors with the authorities when their goals con-
flicted with corporate objectives and the managers possessed more information 
than the owner did. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) indicated that the corporate 
governance mechanism of an enterprise would change with the internationaliza-
tion as the complexity of information handled by managers was enhanced and the 
required professional competence and knowledge became multiple to effectively 
make decisions beneficial to the enterprise, when the degree of internationaliza-
tion was enhanced. Referring to Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), the following 
indicators are contained in this study for corporate governance:
(1) CEO salary = sum of CEO rewards, bonuses, special disbursement, stocks, 
and cash dividends,
(2) CEO shareholding ratio = CEO number of shares held / number of shares 
outstanding,
(3) Independent director ratio = number of independent directors and supervi-
sors / sum of the board of directors.
2.2. Competition
Al-Shboul and Anwar (2014) pointed out competition as the degree of a company’s 
external competition. Industrial concentration ratio was normally used for meas-
uring industrial competition. The so-called industrial concentration ratio referred 
to the ratio of the sales volume of several largest businesses to all sales volume in 
the industry or describing the size and number of businesses in the industry. The 
number of businesses and the size difference were the key factors in the industrial 
monopoly. The more number of businesses and the fewer differences in sizes pre-
sented the lower industrial concentration ratio that the market was closer to a pure 
competition market. Based on market concentration ratio, Cai et al. (2012) classi-
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fied market competition into pure monopoly, monopoly dominant firm, tight oli-
gopoly, loose oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and pure competition. Chien 
(2013) proposed to test market structure with unstructured analysis, and the model 
was constructed under the following assumptions. (1) The market was balanced. 
(2) Businesses pursued profit maximization or cost minimization. Applying the 
ideas to this study, monopoly market, monopolistic competition market, and pure 
competition market are explained as below.
(1)  Monopoly market: Monopoly proposed by Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) 
does not mean merely one business in the market, but refers to the price deci-
sion not being influenced by other strategic interaction or threats. 
(2)  Monopolistic competition market: Other competitors are considered in the 
decisions of monopolistic competitive businesses; the more businesses in 
the market, the higher substitution level of businesses to decrease individual 
business’s needs.
(3)  Pure competition market: In pure competition markets, businesses could 
freely enter the market and acquire production techniques for free. 
2.3. Corporate performance
Performance, as a direct outcome, is the measurement of an organization achiev-
ing the objective (Bartram and Bodnar 2012). In other words, performance is 
1. benefits and effectiveness to complete tasks, 2. evaluated working behaviors, 
methods, and results, and 3. working results of employees presenting effective-
ness and contribution to an enterprise achieving the objectives. Performance, as 
the combination of results and effectiveness, is an enterprise achieving the ben-
efits and objectives as well as the effectiveness and outcomes in a period of time. 
To quantify the operation of a company, the comparison of the operation being 
cost effective, and the commercial benefits is regarded as performance measure-
ment, which could be divided into financial performance, business performance, 
and business efficiency, where sales growth, profitability, earnings per share 
(EPS), and Tobin’s Q are often utilized for reflecting the true economic situations 
of a company (Chava 2011). Performance is the key indicator to measure cor-
porate operation, while operating performance could directly affect the survival 
of an enterprise. The success of policies or objectives of an enterprise could be 
judged the effectiveness through the measurement of performance (Chung and 
Zhou 2012). The measurement of organizational performance could be divided 
into subjective performance and objective performance. Subjective perform-
ance presents managers’ satisfaction with the overall operation, such as mem-
bers’ satisfaction, expected return, trust of organizational members, management 
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ability , and sustainability of organization (De Haan and Sterken 2011). Objective 
performance is the financial data of an organization, e.g. sales growth rate and 
market share, return on assets (ROA), and return on stockholders’ equity (ROE) 
(El Ghoul et al. 2011). Objective performance, i.e. organizational financial per-
formance, is utilized for measuring corporate performance in this study; return 
on assets or return on stockholders’ equity being used as the variable to measure 
corporate performance might result in return on assets or return on stockholders’ 
equity not being able to completely represent corporate performance because of 
the difference in accounting (Goss and Roberts 2011). A lot of research therefore 
suggests to measure corporate performance with Tobin’s Q ratio (dividing market 
value by the replacement price of tangible assets) and P/B-price-book. Tobin’s Q 
ratio and P/B-price-book therefore are used for measuring corporate performance 
in this study.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a company’s assets to the replace-
ment value in the capital market. Corporate value contains the value of existing 
assets and the value of growth opportunity. The former refers to the sum of present 
discounted value of a company’s existing assets being able to generate cash flow 
without new investment, and the latter is determined by the amount invested in 
the future and the difference between return on investment and required rate of re-
turn (Hardi and Buti 2012). Tobin’s Q used to be regarded as the proxy variable in 
past research to measure corporate value and operating performance. The higher 
Tobin’s Q could represent the larger intangible assets or growth opportunity cre-
ated by a company (Kuo et al. 2012). In addition to the fixed assets, the value of 
intangible assets, such as reputation, patent, market oligopoly, or operating abil-
ity, of a company could be used for measuring Tobin’s Q and reflecting the growth 
opportunity. Tobin’s Q therefore stands for a company predicting the future mar-
ket value and performance (Nick and Igor 2011). EPS is the profitability of each 
share, i.e. the profit of a company in a certain period being divided by the num-
ber of circulated shares; earnings per share are generally used. It is measured by 
EPS = surplus in preceding fiscal year–preference dividend ⁄ number of circulated 
shares. Preferred stock is included in stocks, but a part of the properties is similar 
to bonds; the house of issue would provide dividends for preferred stockholders, 
and the received dividends are similar to the interest income of bondholders.
2.4. Effects of competition on corporate governance
Grimminger and Benedetta (2013) indicated that competition could merely be 
increased by reducing managers’ behavior of neglect. Jo and Harjoto (2012) also 
agreed that a company in the pure competition market would reduce the man-
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agers’ behavior of neglect as the company without pursuing profit maximiza-
tion would be eliminated by the market mechanism. Leventis and Dimitropoulos 
(2012) considered that a company in the industry with lower product competition 
would be hard to operate the oversight mechanism in the product market. The 
idea supported the viewpoint of Noronha et al. (2013) that market competition, as 
an important disciplinary mechanism, could reduce managers’ neglect. Oikono-
mou et al. (2012) pointed out the mutual reinforcement effect, rather than substi-
tution effect, between strong product market competition and good governance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, Samia et al. (2011) found out the negative relationship 
between corporate governance and industrial concentration ratio, presenting the 
casual relationship between corporate governance and competition. They further 
discovered that an enterprise with weaker competition in the industry would pro-
vide less protection for the investors, i.e. the worse corporate governance mecha-
nism. The following hypothesis is therefore proposed in this study.
H1: Competition would affect corporate governance.
2.5. Effects of competition on corporate performance
Soti and Gupta (2013) found out the positive correlation between competition 
and corporate productivity, showing the higher competition, the fewer managers’ 
behavior of neglect and the lower waste of corporate resources to further enhance 
the productivity. They also indicated that product market competition is a factor 
in stimulating business efficiency. Chung and Zhou (2012) also pointed out the 
significantly positive correlation between competition and a company’s profit-
ability and productivity. In the research on the effects of product market compe-
tition and ownership structure on corporate performance, De Haan and Sterken 
(2011) found out the remarkably positive correlation between product market 
competition and corporate performance. Goss and Roberts (2011) also pointed 
out the positive effects of product market competition on corporate performance. 
The following hypothesis is therefore proposed in this study.
H2: Competition would affect corporate performance.
2.6. Effects of corporate governance on corporate performance
Brealey et al. (2011) mentioned that competition in both product market and 
capital market could become corporate governance mechanisms; therefore, favo-
rable corporate governance mechanisms should integrate internal investors like 
the board of directors and external product market competition. Product market 
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competition could bring distribution efficiency and corporate governance mecha-
nisms could generate efficiency; both would affect corporate performance. Ela-
min and Tlaiss (2015) assumed that enterprises with ownership diversification 
had the managers control the management right. In this case, managers, without 
high shareholding ratio, would not undertake the failure that the so-called agent 
problem could easily occur. Kao et al. (2012) considered that when an enter-
prise separated ownership and management rights, managers might pursue the 
maximization of personal effectiveness based on selfish motivation and disobey 
corporate profits as they need not undertake extra risks. As a result, increasing 
the shareholding of managers could balance the personal profit with other stock-
holders to enhance the value of the company. Cai et al. (2012) mentioned that 
independent directors, not being insiders of a company, would comparatively 
not encroach on stockholders’ equity and be more objective to maintain inde-
pendent operation than internal directors who might utilize excellent information 
for colluding with managers. Chien (2013) indicated that independent directors 
could enhance the efficiency of the board of directors and could better guarantee 
general stockholders’ equity than internal directors did. Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2012) also discovered that the stock price would notably rise once the news of an 
independent director being designated was announced. The following hypotheses 
therefore are proposed in this study.
H3: Corporate governance would affect corporate performance.
H4: Competition has moderating effects on the effects of corporate governance 
on corporate performance.
3. RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND SUBJECT
3.1. Research structure
Summing up the above literatures, the conceptual structure (Figure 1) is drawn in 
this study to discuss the relationship among competition, corporate governance, 
and corporate performance.
3.2. Research subject and sampling data
Taking listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange as the research samples 
where unsuitable industries are removed, total 10 industries are included in this 
study. As the acquisition of domestic internationalization data is limited and the 
database is updated to 2014, merely the period in 2010–2014 is studied.
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3.3. Analysis method
Analysis of Variance is utilized for discussing the difference of competition in 
corporate governance and corporate performance as well as understanding the 
effects of corporate governance on corporate performance.
4. ANALYSIS RESULT
4.1. Effects of competition on corporate governance and corporate performance
4.1.1. Variance analysis of competition in corporate governance
Applying Analysis of Variance to discuss the difference of competition in cor-
porate governance, competition aiming at monopoly market, monopolistic com-
petition market, and pure competition market are analyzed and explained. From 
Table 1, competition presents notable difference on corporate governance that H1 
is supported.
Table 1. Variance analysis of competition in corporate governance
Variable F P Scheffe post hoc
CEO salary 16.337 0.006* 1>23
CEO shareholding ratio 12.531 0.000* 1>2>3
Independent directors ratio 8.776 0.012* 1>23
* stands for p<0.05
Figure 1. Research structure
Corporate
performance
Corporate
governance
Competition 
H3
H1 H2H4
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4.1.2. Difference analysis of competition in corporate performance
Utilizing Analysis of Variance for discussing the difference of competition in 
corporate performance, competition aiming at monopoly market, monopolistic 
competition market, and pure competition market are analyzed and explained. 
From Table 2, competition reveals significant difference on corporate perform-
ance that H2 is supported.
Table 2. Variance analysis of competition on corporate performance
Variable F P Scheffe post hoc
Tobin’s Q 14.252 0.021* 1>23
P/B-price-book 23.486 0.000* 1>2>3
* stands for p<0.05
4.2. Difference analysis of corporate governance in corporate performance
Applying Analysis of Variance to discuss the difference of corporate governance 
in corporate performance, corporate governance aiming at CEO salary, CEO 
shareholding ratio, and independent director ratio are analyzed and explained. 
From Table 3, CEO salary, CEO shareholding ratio, and independent director ratio 
present remarkable difference on corporate performance that H3 is supported.
Table 3. Variance analysis of corporate governance on corporate performance
Variable F P Scheffe post hoc
Tobin’s Q 10.915 0.003* 12>3
P/B-price-book 18.274 0.000* 12>3
* stands for p<0.05
Data source: Self-organized in this study.
4.3. Effect analysis of competition on corporate governance and corporate 
performance
According to Analysis of Variance discussing the difference of competition and 
corporate governance in corporate performance, the interaction between com-
petition and corporate governance is explored to test the effect of competition. 
From the interaction in Table 4, CEO salary presents the highest competition 
in monopoly market on Tobin’s Q and in monopolistic competition market on 
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P/B-price-book, Figure 2. The margin mean in Figure 3 apparently shows the 
significant interaction that H3 and H4 are supported.
Table 4. Effects of competition and corporate governance on corporate performance
Variable Tobin’s Q P/B-price-book
F P Scheffe post hoc F P Scheffe post hoc
Corporate gover-
nance 10.915 0.003* 12>3 18.274 0.000* 12>3
Competition 14.252 0.021* 1>23 23.486 0.000* 1>2>3
Corporate gover-
nance* competi-
tion
27.633 0.000**
11>12>13>
21>22>23>
33>32>31
24.514 0.000**
12>13>11>
22>23>21>
33>32>31
* stands for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01
Figure 2. Margin mean
monopoly 
market 
1
2
3
4
5
monopolistic 
competition 
market
pure 
competition 
market 
CEOsalary
CEO shareholding 
ratio 
Competition
dŽďŝŶΖƐY
independent 
director ratio
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5. CONCLUSION
The empirical results show that the higher competition of businesses in Taiwan, 
the lower salary for managers and placement of independent directors. However, 
managers’ salaries and the placement of independent directors are closely related 
to the operating performance that it is inferred that the internationalization of 
domestic businesses still remains at the initial stage. The inadequate operating 
experiences in internationalization markets could not instantaneously respond to 
different operating environments from home country (such as designing a reason-
able reward system to cope with overseas additional pay, allowance for living ex-
penses, and tax subsidy in local environment). In this case, the higher competition 
for corporate internationalization results in the lower CEO salary. Besides, another 
possibility is that domestic enterprises tend to reward managers with stock rights 
and salary. Such a tactic originally intends to encourage managers with variable 
salaries, but it ignores the abundant expenses in the beginning of internationaliza-
tion causing the operating performance not being able to reflect the stock price 
so that the predicted encouragement is reduced. The notable effect of corporate 
governance on corporate performance conforms to Michelon and Parbonetti’s 
(2012) research result of positive correlations between stock rewards and cor-
porate governance. In other words, better corporate governance would enhance 
Figure 3. Margin mean
monopoly 
market 
1
2
3
4
5
monopolistic 
competition 
market
pure 
competition 
market 
CEOsalary
CEO shareholding 
ratio 
Competition
P/B-Price-book
independent 
director ratio
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stock rewards; and the effect of corporate governance on corporate performance 
is apparent. Investors therefore should pay attention to the quality of corporate 
governance and consider the internationalization and competition to construct 
the investment combination. For a company, it is necessary to reinforce corporate 
governance in any competitive environments. When an enterprise presents high 
competition and proceeds high internationalization, such as establishing overseas 
branches and overseas common investment, the enterprise presents favorable cor-
porate governance mechanisms to make larger profits.
6. SUGGESTION
Aiming at the above research results, the following suggestions are proposed in 
this study.
1.  Governments in various states have positively implemented transformation 
and innovation to industries in past years. Under such a trend, the exclusive 
market and resources might approach to saturation. In this case, establishing 
an exclusive brand and searching for opportunities to step out the market have 
become essential for businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, businesses would 
encounter the threats of existing industrial manpower, resources, and experi-
ence transfer in the process as well as various potential factors in operating 
performance in new investment environments (e.g. local consumption habits, 
political and economic policies, and exchange rate fluctuation). Such prob-
lems might be the key success factors in international businesses’ corporate 
governance and corporate performance. Accordingly, corporate governance is 
not the sole factor in corporate performance.
2.  An enterprise could re-examine the internal salary and director structure in 
order to make the up-to-date and adaptable policy for retaining and recruiting 
talents with good performance, to encourage existing managers to develop the 
strength for the enterprise, and to attract talents so as to develop and expand 
multiple, deep, and broad operation thinking model for the organization.
3.  Based on the research results and the uniqueness of stock right structure in 
Taiwan, enterprises are suggested to establish complete protection policies 
for minority stockholders and to correspond to the importance of corporate 
governance quality promoted by the public and enterprises. What is more, 
enterprises should try to strengthen domestic industrial competition in order 
to reinforce the competitiveness. After all, Taiwan is an island; internation-
alization is a trend for enterprises. An enterprise could make higher profits 
by keeping the competitive advantages, maintaining the competitiveness, and 
proceeding internationalization.
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